Introduction
This comment highlights the main findings in Griffit-Jones (2012) and discusses some of its main results. Griffit-Jones (2012) represents a major contribution, not only to the understanding of the current European crisis, but also by suggesting specific country level and pan-European measures that can lead to growth recovery. This paper starts by studying the common features between the Latin American crisis during the 1980s and 1990s with the current debt crisis affecting several European economies. Then, the paper proposes a battery of macroeconomic policies at a pan-European level and at a national level to ameliorate the impact of the crisis and to boost the recovery and growth perspectives.
In this short note, I first review the main findings of Griffit-Jones (2012) . In Section 3, I review the main features of the HEIMDAL model used to evaluate the proposed policies in Griffit-Jones (2012) . Then, in Section 4, I expand the set of common features across Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s and the current European crisis by studying the role of volatility changes during those episodes. Finally, Section 5 provides concluding remarks and suggests lines for further research. macroeconomic indicators these economies experienced large private and sovereign debt accumulation.
Regarding the management of the crisis, lessons not yet learned from Latin American experiences seem to be observed in the current European counterpart. The second common feature of both episodes is observed at the bust episode after the beginning crisis. The Latin American crisis was, in a way, an experiment that provided evidence on the consequences of a macroeconomic recipe based on austerity policies without debt restructuring. Similar recipes are currently suggested and adopted as ways out to the crisis for the European countries under macroeconomic distress. The impact of these recipes in Latin American economies, that is the impact of austerity programs without debt restructuring, have had a major negative impact by imposing strong limitations on the capacity to finance imported inputs generating a subsequent negative impact on the growth and economic development of these economies.
As pointed out in Griffit-Jones (2012), debt reductions can substantially ameliorate the short run negative impact of austerity as evident from German experience in the 1950s. However, additional concerns should be raised for Europe because in this case, the solvency of the European banking system can be at stake given that its own banking system is highly exposed to private and sovereign leverage.
In the remainder of the paper, Griffit-Jones (2012) describes both national and panEuropean strategies to restore growth in the region. The European Investment Bank is at the core of pan-European organisms that can boost the recovery. In particular Griffit-Jones (2012) proposes projects from EIB to be financed by different mix of EU budget and EUproject bonds. Moreover, in order to finance large projects, the authors suggest increasing the equity of EIB. The authors use the HEIMDAL model, an international macroeconomic model that will be described in the next section, to asses the impact of their proposed policies.
About the HEIMDAL model
The impact of the policies proposed by Griffit-Jones (2012) in the paper are evaluated using the HEIMDAL model. A detailed description of this model is out of the scope of this comment. However it is important to review its main features to address how robustness exercises regarding policy evaluations could be implemented. For a detailed description of the model, the reader is referred to Hansen and Bjrsted.
HEIMDAL stands for "Historically Estimated International Model of the Danish Labour movement" developed by the Economic Council of the Labour Movement (ECLM). The model captures the interaction of fifteen OECD countries, thirteen European: Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and UK; and USA and Japan. They model both the country and regional European levels. Each country model includes models for households, business sector, labor, prices, foreign sector, government and financial sector.
The relationships in the model are based on a Keynesian modeling background and they are estimated using annual data for the period 1960-2010. Using the HEIMDAL model, Griffit-Jones (2012) studies the impact of expanding the European Investment Bank by doubling its capital, together with an increase in EU budget over the following 3 years. A detailed proposed EIB and EU expenditure program is available in Table 2 in Griffit-Jones (2012) . Under the proposed investment pact, Griffit-Jones (2012) shows that European GDP growth for 2013 can increase from about 1% to about 1.5% ( that is, almost 0.5% larger than the one without the investment pact). For 2014, the model still generates a larger GDP growth rate, about 0.1% than without the investment pact. Together with this, the model also predicts a significant increase in employment reaching up to 1 millon more jobs in EU-27.
4 Beyond the HEIMDAL model: The role of volatility, recessions and the zero lower bound
This section studies additional dimensions that can be important for the evaluation of the policies suggested by Griffit-Jones (2012). First, I document and describe a potentially important common feature observed in both Latin American and European episodes of macroeconomic distress, i.e. increases in macroeconomic volatility. Then, I review related literature that can be helpful to re-evaluate the impact of fiscal policies and debt reductions.
Volatility changes
The following figure presents a measure of macroeconomic volatility and 95% confidence bands, for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Turkey. This measure of macroeconomic volatility is computed using a 5 year and 10 year rolling window to compute standard deviation of GDP. Note: standard errors using 6yr rolling window of the linearly detrended log of GDP and 95% confidence bands. Data for each country is GDP volume estimates in millons of US dollars evaluated at OECD reference year and seasonally adjusted. The source of data for this figure is OECD.stats, code VPVOBARSA.
As can be seen in the figure, the point estimates of volatilities for Argentina seems to increase substantially after 2002 macroeconomic crisis. Moreover, point estimates of volatility seems to increase around 2008, although is not statistically significant.
1 The evidence for Brazil points in the same direction, there are increases in volatility during the beginning of the 2000s, it seems to decrease around 2006 and increase back around 2010..
Using quarterly data, the picture for Mexico shows an increase in volatility around 1986-1987, periods of macroeconomic distress for the Mexican economy, as well as around the Tequila crisis and the beginning of the 2005s until the current period. For the case of Chile the recent turmoils in the world economy seem to be reflected in the increase volatility around 2007 and it seems to be picking up again in 2012.
As can be seen, q common denominator for these countries is also an increase in the volatility by the end of the sample, that can be associated to contagion effects from the USA and European Debt crisis.
On the other hand, the following picture plots similar evidence for the case of selected European economies. Note: standard errors using 6yr rolling window of the linearly detrended log of GDP and 95% confidence bands. Data for each country is GDP volume estimates in millons of US dollars evaluated at OECD reference year and seasonally adjusted. The source of data for this figure is OECD.stats, code VPVOBARSA.
As can be seen in the picture, all 6 economies present large increases in volatility after the [2007] [2008] , years in which the Mortgage crisis started in US and propagated to Europe.
From the perspective of the objective of Griffit-Jones (2012) , this can potentially be an important additional common factor for the evaluation of the impact of both national level and pan-European fiscal or monetary policies. The reason is that, under standard assumptions of conventional theory, economic agents respond to volatile environments with a precautionary behavior that, ultimately might impose severe constraints in the fiscal and monetary policy multipliers.
Given the assumptions of HEIMDAL model, it is implied a unique level of fiscal policy multipliers both for national and pan-European fiscal measures. Recent literature have pointed out that fiscal multipliers might be different during macroeconomic boom and during times of macroeconomic crisis and they might also depend on the monetary policy arrangements. Regarding the first point, see for instance Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) , where the authors find that government expenditure multipliers during recessions are larger than during expansions. On the relation of fiscal multipliers and monetary policy arrangements, Christiano et al. (2009) study the impact of fiscal measures when the zero lower bound is binding and show that also in this case the impact of fiscal policy can be substantially larger compared to the case where the monetary policy is effective.
Concluding comments and suggestions for future research
Given the evidence on volatility changes and the features of the HEIMDAL model, it could be interesting to consider the impact of these policy changes both under high and low volatility scenarios. Moreover, it would be important to consider the interaction between stabilization policies and stochastic volatility. Some recent academic articles, such as the ones mentioned above and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010) , are in this line specifically for the case of USA. Useful tools in order to explore these issues are equilibrium models with exogenous time-varying volatility measures, as well as the time-varying vector autorregression literature. In order to capture the change in behavior induced by time varying volatility, the reader could also consider the DSGE framework, as this framework can potentially capture the precautionary savings motive. An interesting alternative way of approaching this issue is through the use of learning models that can generate endogenous measures of volatility changes, see Milani (2007) . This is and interesting and promising approach given the conventional wisdom that a crisis can have a large impact on the information set of both private agents and policymakers, and a large impact on their beliefs about the post-crisis economy.
